Male MD Gets Treatment from Gynaecologist for Hypertension - Delay in Filing Appeal not Condoned - SC
THE CESTAT dismissed an application for Condonation of Delay and the appeal itself on the following grounds:
1. the question was whether the Managing Director, who was said not to be maintaining good health, was handling the affairs of the Company;
2. the counsel for the appellant had submitted that the Managing Director was not regularly visiting the factory but was managing the day to day affairs of the company on an irregular basis;
3. it was the Cost Accountant who was authorised to deal with the matter, and had received the order;
4. the medical certificate, placed on record, showed that the Managing Director of the appellant was suffering from hypertension with effect from 01.07.2013; the impugned order was received by the appellant on 20.04.2013, and there was sufficient time to prefer an appeal there against;
5. the affairs of the company were being taken care of by others; and, as such, the ill-health of the Managing Director was only an excuse.
On the ground that the delay could not be condoned on flimsy grounds, and there must be sufficient cause for the delay of 218 days, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal.
The assessee took the matter in appeal to the High Court. The High Court observed,
1. It is evident from the order of the Tribunal that the order under challenge before the Tribunal was received not by the Managing Director but by the Cost Accountant of the appellant Company.
2. It is also clear that the Managing Director was not even visiting the factory and it was the Cost Accountant who was authorised to deal with the subject matter of the appeal.
3. The Tribunal has also noted that the medical certificate, produced on behalf of the appellant, showed that the appellant's Managing Director was suffering from Hypertension with effect from 01.07.2013, whereas the impugned order was received even earlier on 20.04.2013 itself.
4. While interference under Section 35G of the Act would only be justified if a substantial question of law arises for consideration, and a substantial question of law can be said to arise only if the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal is either based on no evidence or suffers from perversity.
5. We also examined the certificate to determine whether or not the illness, which the Managing Director of the appellant was said to have suffered from, was noticed by the Tribunal. The said medical certificate was issued by a doctor whose qualification, as recorded in the certificate itself, is M.B.B.S, D.G.O. The Managing Director of the appellant did not suffer from any gynaecological disorder. It is difficult to believe that the Managing Director of Appellant-Company would undergo treatment for Hypertension Heart Disease from a gynaecologist, and not a cardiologist for a heart disease.
6. In any event, the medical certificate dated 23.02.2014 appears to have been obtained just before, and for the purpose of, filing the appeal before the Tribunal.
7. No details as to the nature of treatment, which the Managing Director of the Appellant-Company is said to have undergone from 01.07.2013 till 23.02.2014, are even referred to in the said certificate.
8. We see no reason, therefore, to exercise jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Act to interfere with the order under appeal.
The assessee took the matter in SLP to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court last Monday dismissed the SLP in a one-line order: -
The special leave petition is dismissed.