TIOL-DDT 2619 · Monday, 15 June 2015 · story 7 of 10

Prosecution of Central Excise Assistant Commissioner under IPC and PC Act - Validity of sanction to prosecute - Supreme Court orders trial

IN 2004, the CBI registered a case against a Commissioner and an Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise for demanding and accepting a bribe. The CBI submitted a report recommending launching of prosecution against both the Officers under different provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) as well as the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.(PC Act). Sanction for prosecution of the Commissioner was received in 2007 and the CBI filed a complaint in the Trial Court showing the Assistant Commissioner also as an accused. The trial court discharged the Assistant Commissioner as, admittedly, at that point of time there was no sanction accorded for his prosecution.

Subsequently, the matter concerning sanction for prosecution of the Assistant Commissioner was taken up and eventually sanction was accorded in the File by the Finance Minister on 8th August, 2009 on the basis of which a formal order granting sanction was issued on 12th August, 2009. It also appears that on 14th September, 2009 a Corrigendum was issued to effect certain corrections in the sanction order dated 12th August, 2009 whereafter another sanction order (revised sanction) was issued on 21st October, 2009.

The Delhi High Court on consideration of the matter took the view that the grant of sanction in the instant case by the Competent Authority was at the behest of the CBI and the same does not disclose a fair and independent application of mind. The High Court also took the view that the subsequent Sanction Order dated 21st October, 2009 was without the approval of the Sanctioning Authority. On these two grounds, the High Court thought it proper to interdict the order dated 21st October, 2009 granting sanction for prosecution of the Assistant Commissioner.

The CBI is in appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that the validity of a Sanction Order, if one exists, has to be tested on the touchstone of the prejudice to the accused which is essentially a question of fact and, therefore, should be left to be determined in the course of the trial and not in the exercise of jurisdiction either under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in a proceeding under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. High Court was not at all justified in passing the impugned order and in interfering with the sanction order.

High Court order is set aside and trial ordered.

The trial court was directed to complete the trial within an outer limit of 12 months.

cited in this story