Obiter Dictum or Ratio Decidendi
IN Union of India v Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co Ltd – , Justice KC Das Gupta made an observation – "Excise duty is on the manufacture of goods and not on the sale". Was it an obiter dictum or ratio decidendi?
In a recent judgement (), the Guwahati High Court examined the concepts in detail.
It can, broadly speaking, be said that what is not a ratio decidendi is an obiter dictum and it is the ratio decidendi, which is binding on the Courts.
"Obiter dictum" is described as "statements of law made by a judge in the course of a decision, arising out of the circumstances of the case, but not necessary for the decision."…
In Mohandas Issardas v. A. N. Sattanathan (AIR 1955 Bom 113), the point, under consideration, was whether an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court was as much binding upon the High Courts as an express decision given by the Supreme Court. However, the allied question, as to what is an obiter dictum, which has a binding effect upon a Court, was also commented upon. Obiter dictum was regarded as an expression of opinion on a point, which was not necessary to the decision of the case.
It was observed,:
"….6. But the question still remains as to what is an 'obiter dictum' given expression to by the Supreme Court which is binding upon the Courts in India. Now, an 'obiter dictum' is an expression of opinion on a point which is not necessary for the decision of a case. This very definition draws a clear distinction between a point which is necessary for the determination of a case and a point which is not necessary for the determination of the case. But in both cases points must arise for the determination of the tribunal. Two questions may arise before a Court for its determination. The Court may determine both although only one of them may be necessary for the ultimate decision of the case. The question which was necessary for the determination of the case would be the 'ratio decidendi'; the opinion of the tribunal on the question which was not necessary to decide the case would be only an 'obiter dictum'.
"...It is of course perfectly familiar doctrine that obiter dictum though they may have great weight as such are not conclusive authority. Obiter dictum in this context means what the words literally signify namely, statements by the way. If a judge thinks it desirable to give his opinion on some point which is not necessary for the decision of the case that of course has not the binding weight of the decision of the case and the reasons for the decision."
"It may be laid down as general rule that that part alone of a decision of a Court of law is binding upon courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and inferior Courts which consists of the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which the question before the Court has really been determined. This underlying principle which forms the only authoritative element of a precedent is often termed the ‘ratio decidendi'. Statements which are not necessary to the decision, which go beyond the occasion and lay down a rule that is unnecessary for the purpose at hand (usually termed dicta) have no binding authority on another Court, though they may have some merely persuasive efficacy."
In the light of the observations made above, in Mohandas Issardas , it becomes clear that, according to the Bombay High Court, two questions may arise before a Court for its determination. The Court may determine both, although only one of them may be necessary for the ultimate decision of the case. The question, which was necessary for the determination of the case would be the 'ratio decidendi', but the opinion on the question, which was not necessary to decide the case, would be only an ‘obiter dictum'.
A Constitution Bench of eleven judges of the Supreme Court, in H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Raovs Union of India (1971 AIR 530), had the occasion to consider the scope of ‘obiter dictum' and observed:
"Every observation of this Court is no doubt, entitled to weight but an obiter, cannot take the place of the ratio. Judges are not oracles. In the very nature of things, it is not possible to give the same attention to incidental matters as is given to the actual issues arising for decision. Further much depends on the way the case is presented to them ."
The Supreme Court, in Arun Kumar Aggarwalvs State Of M.P. & Ors. (AIR 2011 SC 3056), has considered the concept of ‘obiter dictum' in the following words:
"21. At this stage, it is pertinent to consider the nature and scope of a mere observation or obiter dictum in the Order of the Court. The expression obiter dictum or dicta has been discussed in American Jurisprudence 2nd, Vol. 20, at pg. 437 as thus:
‘Dicta'
Ordinarily, a court will decide only the questions necessary for determining the particular case presented. But once a court acquires jurisdiction, all material questions are open for its decision; it may properly decide all questions so involved, even though it is not absolutely essential to the result that all should be decided. It may, for instance, determine the question of the constitutionality of a statute, although it is not absolutely necessary to the disposition of the case, if the issue of constitutionality is involved in the suit and its settlement is of public importance. An expression in an opinion which is not necessary to support the decision reached by the court is dictum or obiter dictum.
‘Dictum' or ‘obiter dictum' is distinguished from the ‘holding of the court in that the so- called law of the case'; does not extend to mere dicta, and mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis,
As applied to a particular opinion, the question of whether or not a certain part thereof is or is not a mere dictum is sometimes a matter of argument. And while the terms ‘dictum' and ‘obiter dictum' are generally used synonymously with regard to expressions in an opinion which are not necessary to support the decision, in connection with the doctrine of stare decisis, a distinction has been drawn between mere obiter and ‘judicial dicta' the latter being an expression of opinion on a point deliberately passed upon by the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Further at pg. 525 and 526, the effect of dictum has been discussed: "190. Decision on legal point; effect of dictum ... In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, a distinction is made between a holding and a dictum. Generally stare decisis does not attach to such parts of an opinion of a court which are mere dicta. The reason for distinguishing a dictum from a holding has been said to be that a question actually before the court and decided by it is investigated with care and considered in its full extent, whereas other principles, although considered in their relation to the case decided, are seldom completely investigated as to their possible bearing on other cases. Nevertheless courts have sometimes given dicta the same effect as holdings, particularly where ‘judicial dicta' as distinguished from ‘obiter dictum' are involved"
22. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd ed. 2005), the expression ‘observation' means a view, reflection; remark; statement; observed truth or facts; remarks in speech or writing in reference to something observed.
24. The Blacks Law Dictionary, (9th ed, 2009) defines term `obiter dictum' as a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive). -- Often shortened to dictum or, less commonly, obiter. Strictly speaking an `obiter dictum' is a remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, `by the way' -- that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any statement of law enunciated by the judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or suggestion.... In the common speech of lawyers, all such extrajudicial expressions of legal opinion are referred to as `dicta,' or`obiter dictum,' these two terms being used interchangeably.
25 The Word and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 29 defines the expression `obiter dictum' or `dicta' thus:
‘Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself; obiter dictum are opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects; It is mere observation by a judge on a legal question suggested by the case before him, but not arising in such a manner as to require decision by him; ‘Obiter dictum' is made as argument or illustration, as pertinent to other cases as to the one on hand, and which may enlighten or convince, but which in no sense are a part of the judgment in the particular issue, not binding as a precedent, but entitled to receive the respect due to the opinion of the judge who utters them; Discussion in an opinion of principles of law which are not pertinent, relevant, or essential to determination of issues before court is ‘obiter dictum'.
To summarise:
(a) A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is the essence, in a decision, is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or the principles on which a question before a Court has been decided, is alone binding as a precedent.
(b) In a given case, two questions may arise before a Court for its determination. The Court may determine both, although only one of them may be necessary for the ultimate decision of the case. The question, which was necessary for the determination of the case would be the 'ratio decidendi'. However, the opinion of the tribunal on the question, which was not necessary to decide the case would be only an 'obiter dictum'.
(c) ‘Obiter dictum' is made as argument or illustration, as pertinent to other cases as to the one on hand, and which may enlighten or convince, but which in no sense are a part of the judgment in the particular issue, not binding as a precedent, but entitled to receive the respect due to the opinion of the judge who utters them.